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NOTE
TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. V FCC:
THE FATE OF "MUST-CARRY"
STILL UNCERTAIN
I. INTRODUCrION
Cable television will play a big role in the development of the
"information superhighway." The cable phenomenon, with its great
technological possibilities, is continually changing what we watch on
television and the way we watch it. With the advent of interactive
communication, which will allow access to home banking, shopping and
other services, traditional television programming could become a thing of
the past.' Some cable systems will soon be able to accommodate up to
500 channels, with programming to suit every interest and taste.2 If
effective regulations are to be enacted, the legislature needs to act, before
the cable industry expands beyond control.
One controversial means of controlling the cable industry is the
"must-carry" regulations. These regulations require cable systems to
reserve a certain number of channels for the transmission of local broadcast
stations Because the United States Supreme Court has not issued a clear
and comprehensive declaration as to the constitutionality of must-carry
regulations, their future existence remains uncertain. The Court needs to
strike a balance between the interest in protecting the consumer and local
broadcast sources with the interest in promoting new technologies.
Part H of this Note analyzes the ever-changing development of
must-carry regulations through a historical account of congressional action
and case law. Part III focuses on the much anticipated Turner Broadcast-
ing Sys., Inc. v. FCC4 decision and how the Supreme Court's ruling will
1. Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information
Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062, 1081 (1994).
2. Id. at 1082.
3. See infra note 25.
4. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
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affect the cable regulation scheme. Finally, Part IV discusses the standard
of First Amendment analysis, the economic aspects of Turner, and the
aftermath of the Court's decision. As one court watcher put it, "[t]he
Supreme Court, an institution that takes pride in doing things the old-fash-
ioned way and prohibits tape recorders and cameras in the courtroom,
yesterday met the Information Age."5
II. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory History of Cable Television
1. The 1934 Act
The foundation of broadcast regulation started with the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 ("1934 Act").6 The 1934 Act directed the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") to "regulate broadcasting in a
manner that will serve 'the public interest, convenience, or necessity."'"
Though broad, this pronouncement did not necessarily include cable, as
cable television did not appear until the late 1940s.' Nevertheless, the
FCC did not wait for an explicit grant of power over cable by either
Congress or the courts. During the early 1960s, the FCC decided to
unilaterally assert jurisdiction "when it became more concerned that a
rapidly growing cable industry threatened the viability of free television."9
Thus, the cable industry saw the emergence of the controversial must-carry
provisions. These provisions continued to exist, albeit with various
challenges, throughout the 1970s.
2. The 1984 Act
Starting in the 1980s with the Reagan/Bush era, the idea that
government should not interfere with business took center stage in political
discourse. Both the Reagan and Bush administrations adopted a laissez-
5. Joan Biskupic, Court Weighs Regulation of Cable TV Question Confronted for the First
Time, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1994, at A15.
6. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1988).
7. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMEaR ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATiSE ON
THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 14.01(1], at 14-2 (1994) (quoting 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(a), 312(a)(2)
(1988)).
8. David Swan, Comment, "Must-Cany" in the 1992 Cable Bill: Will the Third Time Be
a Charm?, 12 J.L. & COM. 367, 368 (1993).
9. lia at 369-70.
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faire ° policy - "a political-economic philosophy of the government of
allowing the marketplace to operate relatively free of restrictions and
intervention."" Thus, a deregulatory trend emerged in Congress, leading
to the enactment of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 ("1984
Act").'2  The 1984 Act clearly marked a change in regulation by
implementing a localized licensing process which shifted regulatory
authority away from the FCC to local agencies.13 By this time, all the
previous measures that had protected broadcasters were "repealed,
substantially weakened, or subjected to liberal waivers by the Commission
... ,"14 The FCC had little recourse as all this was unfolding.
With the change in political administrations in the 1990s, must-carry
has once again risen to the forefront. Although the development of new
cable technology was avidly encouraged by the government in the previous
decade, the current attitude is that cable poses a threat to traditional
broadcast media.'5 However, is this congressional attitude at odds with
the current hype over the information superhighway? This change can be
explained as another phase in the regulation-deregulation cycle of cable life.
3. The 1992 Act
The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992 ("1992 Act") 16 was passed "[t]o amend the Communications Act of
1934 to provide increased consumer protection and to promote increased
competition in the cable television and related markets .... "" Congres-
sional studies have consistently shown that the cable industry today has
certainly grown into a giant' 8 Cable experienced exponential growth,
especially during the 1980s. 9 By 1991, there were "approximately 10,800
operating cable systems in the United States, serving over 28,000
communities, reaching about 54 million subscribers."" Now, more than
10. A French term, literally meaning: "let (people) do (as they please)." WEBSTER'S NEW
,VOR.D DICTIONARY 788 (2d ed. 1978).
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 876 (6th ed. 1990).
12. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1988).
13. Swan, supra note 8, at 374.
14. Paul Glist, Cable Must Carry - Again, 39 FED. COMM. LJ. 109, 111 (1987) (footnotes
omitted).
15. See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
16. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 47 U.S.C.).
17. Itd
18. 138 CoNG. REC. S14222 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1992) (Conference Report).
19. 138 CONG. RsC. E1033 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1992) (Extension of Remarks).
20. Id.
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half of the nation's television households are served by cable and that
number is continually rising.2 The 1992 Act was seen as a way to
control the cable industry from running rampant.' However, the Bush
Administration argued that "fair access legislation was unnecessary because
remedies under existing law provide competitors with sufficient recourse
in the courts to address anticompetitive conduct."' Ultimately, Congress'
convictions concerning cable industry regulation were strong enough to
override President Bush's veto of the 1992 Act.24
Of particular controversy are Sections 4 and 5 of the 1992 Act,25
21. Id.
22. The 1992 Act provides the following statement of policy:
It is the policy of the Congress in this Act to -
(1) promote the availability to the public of a diversity of views and information
through cable television and other video distribution media;
(2) rely on the marketplace, to the maximum extent feasible, to achieve that
availability;
(3) ensure that cable operators continue to expand, where economically justified,
their capacity and the programs offered over their cable systems;
(4) where cable television systems are not subject to effective competition, ensure
that consumer interests are protected in receipt of cable service; and
(5) ensure the cable television operators do not have undue market power vis-a-vis
video programmers and consumers.
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(b),
106 Stat. 1460, 1463 (1992).
23. Nicholas W. Allard, The 1992 Cable Act: Just the Beginning, 15 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. LJ. 305, 325-26 (1993) (quoting 138 CONG. REc. H6536 (daily ed. July 23, 1992) (remarks
by Representative Synar (D-OK) during floor debates prior to defeat of Representative Manton's
(D-NY) substitute bill supported by the White House, and passage of Representative Tauzin's (D-
LA) access language that, but for strengthening amendments in Conference, was ultimately
enacted into law)).
24. Gary S. Lutzker, The 1992 Cable Act and the First Amendment: What Must, Must Nor,
And May Be Carried, 12 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. LJ. 467, 486 (1994).
25. Sections 4 and 5 of the 1992 Act, in relevant part, require:
SEC. 4. CARRIAGE OF LOCAL COMMERCIAL TELEVISION SIGNALS.
(b) SIGNALS REQUIRED. -
(1) IN GENERAL. - (A) A cable operator of a cable system with 12
or fewer usable activated channels shall carry the signals of at least three
local commercial television stations, except that if such a system has 300 or
fewer subscribers, it shall not be subject to any requirements under this
section so long as such system does not delete from carriage by that system
any signal of a broadcast television station.
(B) A cable operator of a cable system with more than 12 usable
activated channels shall carry the signals of local commercial television
stations, up to one-third of the aggregate number of usable activated
channels of such system [emphasis added].
SEC. 5. CARRIAGE OF NONCOMMERCIAL STATIONS.
o) REQUIREuMENTS To CARRY QUALIFIED STATIONS. -
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which require the carriage of local commercial television signals and
noncommercial stations. These two provisions were designed to promote
the future viability of over-the-air television broadcasting by restoring
equity to the relationship between broadcasters and cable operators.26
While cable operators might argue that such requirements are rigid, the
language of each section provides some accommodation in terms of cable
system capacity. For example, under Section 4, there is a distinction as to
the number of local commercial television stations that must be carried
depending on whether the cable system offers more or less than twelve
channels.27 The requirements for the carriage of noncommercial educa-
tional television stations under Section 5 are determined according to
twelve or fewer, thirteen to thirty-six, or more than thirty-six usable
activated channels.
2
Moreover, the 1992 Act "gives each local TV station the choice of
giving up its must-carry right in favor of negotiating a separate deal with
its local cable operator.' 9 However, this option could hurt the viewers.
For example, a popular local station could use this alternative option to
"extract from a cable system a payment for each viewer" the local station
(2)(A) SYSTEMS wrr 12 oR FbhWER CHANNEiS. - Notwithstanding
paragraph (1), a cable operator of a cable system with 12 or fewer usable
activated channels shall be required to carry the signal of one qualified local
noncommercial educational television station; except that a cable operator
of such a system shall comply with subsection (c) and may, in its discretion,
carry the signals of other qualified noncommercial educational television
stations.
(3) SYSTEMS wrrH 13 TO 36 CHANNELs - (A) Subject to subsection
(c), a cable operator of a cable system with 13 to 36 usable activated
channels -
(i) shall carry the signal of at least one qualified local noncom-
mercial educational television station but shall not be required to
carry the signals of more than three such stations ....
(D) A cable operator of a system described in this paragraph which
increases the usable activated channel capacity of the system to more than
36 channels on or after March 29, 1990, shall, in accordance with the other
provisions of this section, carry the signal of each qualified local non-
commercial educational television station requesting carriage, subject to
subsection (e).
§§ 4-5, 106 Stat. at 1471, 1477-78 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-35 (1988)).
26. See generally id. § 2(a), 106 Stat. at 1462 (noting the growing economic disparity
between broadcast and cable television).
27. See 1992 Act, supra note 25.
28. See id.
29. George Mannes, Cable Scorecard, VIDEO MAO., May 1993, at 47; see § 6, 106 Stat. at
1482 (Retransmission Consent For Cable Systems).
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reaches through cable.30 In turn, cable operators may pass along the costs
of retransmitting television stations to their customers.3
Clearly, "[g]iven its immense economic, political, and social impact,
federal courts will often find themselves interpreting the meaning and the
constitutionality of the 1992 Act."32 Congress provided an elaborate list
of findings to substantiate its policies.3 In addition, the strong nexus
between Congress' policies and its assertion of a fundamental government
interest can favorably influence the federal courts.' Congress has learned
its lesson from attacks made on previous must-carry regulations, which
were enacted without such a comprehensive basis of support.3 ' Neverthe-
less, no matter how much foresight Congress might have to strengthen its
policymaking, the ultimate fate of must-carry legislation rests on court
adjudication.
B. Historical Case Development
Constitutional litigation in cable television regulation has been
evolving since cable's inception. The fundamental issue considered in all
previous cases was whether the FCC had the authority to regulate cable
television. To its credit, the Supreme Court has issued clear-cut rulings
with regard to this matter.
1. The Supreme Court Establishing FCC Control Over Cable
In United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.3" the Supreme Court, for
the first time, recognized FCC jurisdiction over cable television. 7 The
FCC, acting on Midwest Television's complaint, restricted Southwestern
Cable Co. from expanding cable transmission into areas which adversely
affected Midwest Television. 8  Midwest's complaint alleged that
Southwestern was importing Los Angeles station signals into San Diego,
thereby fragmenting Midwest's viewing audience and reducing advertising
revenues to local stations.3 9 The Court held that "[t]he Commission's
30. Mannes, supra note 29, at 47.
31. Id.
32. Swan, supra note 8, at 385-86 (footnotes omitted).
33. 1992 Act, supra note 22, § 2(a), 106 Stat. at 1460-63.
34. Swan, supra note 8. at 388 (footnote omitted).
35. Id
36. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
37. Swan, supra note 8, at 370.
38. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at 160.
39. Id. at 160 n.4.
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authority to regulate broadcasting and other communications is derived
from the Communications Act of 1934, as amended."" In this case, the
FCC had not exceeded or abused its authority." Acting in a new and
dynamic field, Congress gave the FCC expansive powers pursuant to the
1934 Act.42 Thus, the FCC was to act as the "single Government
agency" '43 with sole authority to regulate all forms of electronic commun-
ication, including cable.'
One year later, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,4' the Court
made its boldest ruling concerning the role of the FCC. The Court upheld
the FCC regulations promulgated under the "fairness" doctrine, which
required a radio station to provide time for response for a person personally
attacked "in the context of controversial public issues . . . .,, In the
spirit of the First Amendment, the Court believed it was in the FCC's
interest to preserve an "uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market
.... , Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the proper focus should
be on the viewers' interests and not on the rights of broadcasters. 8 While
the facts of this case did not explicitly deal with cable television, the
Court's decision strengthened the FCC's power over broadcasters in
general. The FCC has relied on this decision as a basis of its authority to
govern all forms of communication, including cable television.
a. "Reasonably Ancillary"
Further development of FCC jurisdiction over cable television was
enunciated in United States v. Midwest Video Corp. ("Midwest P").49
Midwest I involved a regulation that required cable operators "with 3500
or more subscribers to originate a significant amount of local program-
40. ld. at 167. The 1934 Act required the FCC to attempt to .'make available, so far as
possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nation-wide, and world-wide wire
and radio communication service .... .' Mark Glenn, Comment, Communications Law - A
Must-Carry Rerun:. Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 14 J. CORP. L. 265, 267 n.23 (1988)
(quoting 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)).
41. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at 181.
42. Id. at 173.
43. H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).
44. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at 167-68.
45. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
46. Id. at 369-70.
47. Id. at 390.
48. Id.
49. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
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ring ... ,""0 Despite the fact that the regulation failed to define what
constituted a "significant amount," the Court's standard centered on
"whether the Commission's program-origination rule is 'reasonably
ancillary to the effective performance of [its] various responsibilities for the
regulation of television broadcasting."' 5' The Court found that the
regulations satisfied this reasonably ancillary standard. 2
In FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. ("Midwest fI"),s3 the Court limited
this reasonably ancillary standard. The Court invalidated a more demand-
ing regulation than that in Midwest I because the FCC treated cable as a
common carrier - allowing a broad right to public access. s4  The
regulation involved in Midwest II mandated that cable systems have a
capacity of at least twenty channels and allow public access to four of those
channels.55  Furthermore, the "authority to compel cable operators to
provide common carriage of public-originated transmissions must come
specifically from Congress," not the FCC.5 6  The Court limited the
Midwest I standard based on the realization that otherwise the FCC
jurisdiction would be essentially unbounded. 7
b. Modem Affirmation
More recently, the Court has maintained the position that the FCC has
a justified interest in regulating cable, but has continued to issue vague
pronouncements as to the limits of this authority. For example, in Capital
Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,8 the Court, in invalidating a state regulation
requiring "cable television operators in that State to delete all advertise-
ments for alcoholic beverages contained in the out-of-state signals that they
retransmit by cable to their subscribers,"5 9 held that "[t]he power
delegated to the FCC plainly comprises authority to regulate the signals
carried by cable television systems.' 6° In essence, federal law preempted
50. Swan, supra note 8, at 371.
51. Midwest 1, 406 U.S. at 663 (alteration in original) (quoting Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S.
at 178).
52. Id.
53. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
54. ML at 708-09.
55. Id at 691.
56. Id. at 709.
57. See generally id. at 706, 708 (discussing the scope of the FCC's authority and
jurisdiction).
58. 467 U.S. 691 (1984).
59. Id at 694.
60. Id at 699.
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state law in this area of regulation. Therefore, the effect of any state cable
regulations conflicting with FCC regulations is precluded. While this
decision reiterates the Court's position that the FCC possesses broad
authority, there is no clear enunciation as to the scope of this authority.
c. Confronting the Underlying First Amendment Issue
A case that dealt more squarely with First Amendment concerns was
Leathers v. Medlock.6' Leathers concerned Arkansas' extension of its
generally applicable sales tax to cable television services alone, while
exempting the print media.62  The Court held that although, cable
television, which provides news, information, and entertainment to its
subscribers, is engaged in "speech" and is part of the "press" in much of
its operation, "the fact that it is taxed differently from other media does not
by itself ... raise First Amendment concerns." 63  This rationale was
perhaps an indication by the Court that cable is not accorded as much First
Amendment protection as the print media. This would help explain why
the Court has given the FCC so much power over cable. Of particular note
to the Court was that there was no indication that Arkansas had "targeted
cable television in a purposeful attempt to interfere with its First Amend-
ment activities." 64  The Court has recently identified this "targeting"
standard in the must-carry provisions.'
2. The D.C. Circuit's Ruling - The Fall of "Must-Carry"
While the Supreme Court has provided some enlightenment on the
issue of FCC regulatory power over cable, the federal courts of appeals
have made the greatest impact.66 Prior to Turner, no Supreme Court case
61. 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
62. Id. at 442-43.
63. Id at 444.
64. Id. at 448.
65. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Buckeye Cablevision, Inc. v. FCC, 387 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (upholding
the FCC's distant signal rules and the cease-and-desist order issued under them); Home Box
Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977)
(invalidating FCC regulation limiting the number and type of feature films and sports events that
cable systems could offer to their subscribers); Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th
Cir. 1968) (upholding FCC rule prohibiting duplication of programs on same day they are
presented by a local station); Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d
1396 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the cable company had an adequate First Amendment claim
against a city policy of auctioning off the right to provide service in particular areas and in
limiting each area to a single franchisee).
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had even dealt with must-carry provisions. Yet, the District of Columbia
Circuit has squarely faced the challenge. In 1985, in Quincy Cable TN
Inc. v. FCC,67 the D.C. Circuit reviewed a challenge to an FCC order
requiring Quincy Cable to carry the signals of several local broadcast
stations or else pay a $5,000 "forfeiture."
' '
First, the court emphasized what lower federal courts had already
held: that conduct engaged in by cable operators is afforded First
Amendment protection. 9 With this in mind, the Quincy court declared
the must-carry rules unconstitutional. This decision was based on the
finding that "[t]he rules coerce speech; they require the operator to carry
the signals of local broadcasters regardless of their content and irrespective
of whether the operator considers them appropriate programming for the
community it serves."'  However, the court conceded that a different
standard of First Amendment review should apply to cable7 because,
unlike broadcast television, the notion of "physically scarce airwaves is
plainly inapplicable. 7 2 Yet, the court did not suggest the actual level of
review required. Of particular note is that the court in Quincy left open the
option that the FCC could revise the must-carry rules to be more sensitive
to First Amendment concerns.
73
Second, the court found that the FCC rules were premised on
economic assumptions, not hard evidence. Thus, there may be times when
"a 'regulation perfectly reasonable and appropriate in the face of a given
problem may be highly capricious if that problem does not exist."' 4 This
proved to be a recuiring hurdle in subsequent cases.
It was not long before the D.C. Circuit was once again asked to
interpret must-carry rules, this time a revised version, in Century Communi-
cations Corp. v. FCC.75 The significant changes from the prior Quincy
regulations included: (1) an effective period of five years; (2) limits on
how many channels a cable carrier must devote to must-carry; and (3)
67. 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
68. Id. at 1438.
69. Id. at 1444.
70. Id. at 1452.
7 1. Alison K. Greene, Note, Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission:
Should the FCC Revive Cable Television's Must Carry Requirement?, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REv.
1369, 1383 (1986).
72. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1450.
73. Id. at 1463.
74. Id. at 1455 (alteration in original) (quoting Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9,
36 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977)).
75. 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
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limits on the pool of potential must-carry channels. 76 However, the
Century court was still unconvinced that the updated rules were necessary
to advance any substantial governmental interest and declared the revised
regulations unconstitutional.' The court used the same reasoning as it did
in Quincy, emphasizing that "when trenching on first amendment [sic]
interests, even incidentally, the government must be able to adduce either
empirical support or at least sound reasoning on behalf of its measures. 78
But, as before, the court did not suggest that must-carry rules were per se
unconstitutional.79
The Supreme Court may have been successful at avoiding the
must-carry issue in previous cases like Quincy and Century, but it could not
evade the issue forever. The parties involved on both sides of Turner
eagerly anticipated the Court's decision expecting clearer guidance on the
issue.' Turner, however, failed to provide such guidance.
IIl. TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. V. FCC81
A. Facts
Turner Broadcasting System ("TBS") and numerous other cable
programmers and operators ("petitioners") challenged the constitutionality
of the must-carry provisions (Sections 4 and 5) of the 1992 Act which
require cable systems to reserve a portion of their channels for the
transmission of local television stations.8" The petitioners contended that
such provisions abridged their First Amendment rights of' freedom of
speech and/or of the press. 3 Therefore, they further maintained that the
Supreme Court should apply a strict scrutiny analysis of the provisions."
76. Id at 296-97.
77. Id. at 293.
78. Id. at 304.
79. Id
80. Dennis Wharton, Must-Carry Verdict Due, DAILY VARIETY, June 24, 1994, at 1; see
generally PATRICK PARSONS, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4 (1987)
(discussing the uncertainty and conflict with past lower court decisions on the issue).
81. 114 S. CL 2445 (1994).
82. Id. at 2451.
83. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
84. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2464.
19951
456 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15
B. Procedural History
1. The District Court Panel's Opinion
The case was first filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia.85 The District Court granted summary judgment to
the United States and other intervenor-defendants, holding the must-carry
provisions to be consistent with the First Amendment.86 Furthermore, the
District Court concluded that the provisions warranted only an intermediate
standard of scrutiny," finding that "the preservation of local broadcasting
is an important governmental interest, and that the must-carry provisions
are sufficiently tailored to serve that interest."88
The court's decision, however, was divided. Judge Stephen F.
Williams, the lone dissenter, chose to side with the cable operator's
position that must-carry rules should be subject to strict scrutiny review.89
Based on this standard, Judge Williams said the provisions were unconstitu-
tional because "Congress was favoring one set of speakers over anoth-
er.
, 90
85. The proceedings were held before a special three-judge panel which Congress provided
for in anticipation that cable companies would challenge the provisions of the 1992 Act. Claudia
MacLachlan, High Court Holds TV's Future, NAT'L LJ., Jan. 10, 1994, at 1. From here, an
appeal was muted directly to the Supreme Court, bypassing the Circuit Court of Appeals. Id.
This sped up the process tremendously.
86. Turner, 114 S. CL at 2451.
87. Intermediate scrutiny is explained as follows: "[W]hen judging content-neutral laws
governing speech (such as time, place, or manner regulations), the Court generally employs some
variation of 'intermediate scrutiny,' a standard that does impose meaningful limits on government,
and under which challengers have at least a fair fighting chance of getting the law struck down."
SMOLLA, supra note 7, § 3.02[l][b], at 3-Il to 3-12. "The Supreme Court applies this inter-
mediate level of review to content-neutral laws because such laws, although 'innocent' in the
sense that they are not the product of any governmental impulse to censor speech, still have the
effect of reducing the total quantity of speech circulating in society." Id. at § 3.0211][b], at 3-12
(citing Martin Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV.
113, 128 (1981)) (emphasis in original).
88. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2455.
89. MacLachlan, supra note 85, at 29. "The 'strict scrutiny' test is the 'default standard' for
measuring the content-based regulation of speech." SMOLLA, supra note 7, § 3.03[1][a], at 3-82.
"Under the strict scrutiny test, laws regulating the content of speech will be upheld only when
they are justified by 'compelling' governmental interests and are 'narrowly tailored' (or employ
the 'least restrictive means') to effectuate those interests." Il
90. MacLachlan, supra note 85, at 29.
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2. Injunction Sought by TBS
With a huge stake in the battle against must-carry, TBS and its
supporters vigorously litigated the issue on appeal. Threatened by the
lower court's decision, they sought to enjoin enforcement of the 1992 Act
while this case was pending on direct appeal to the United States Supreme
Court.9 Chief Justice Rehnquist, acting as Circuit Justice for the District
of Columbia Circuit, denied the application for an injunction.' First,
Rehnquist reasoned that "[t]he 1992 Cable Act, like all Acts of Congress,
is presumptively constitutional."'93 Therefore, given this benefit of the
doubt, the 1992 Act "should remain in effect pending a final decision on
[its] merits .... 9'
Second, the Chief Justice had reservations about issuing such
extraordinary relief because "[u]nlike a stay, which temporarily suspends
'judicial alteration of the status quo,' an injunction 'grants judicial
intervention that has been withheld by the lower courts.' 95 Thus, the
power to grant injunctions should be used sparingly.95 Furthermore,
Justice Rehnquist reiterated the following criteria for adjudicating whether
an injunction should issue: "(1) it is 'necessary or appropriate in aid of
[our] jurisdiction,' and (2) the legal rights at issue are 'indisputably
clear." '97 At this stage of the litigation, he reasoned, the First Amendment
issues were not yet fully developed as to make it "indisputably clear" that
applicants had a right to be free of the must-carry provisions. 9  For
instance, the pivotal question of "whether the activities of cable operators
are more akin to that of newspapers or wireless broadcasters" 99 had yet to
be addressed. Although TBS was not granted the benefit of an injunction,
Chief Justice Rehnquist's brief statements concerning the case were a
preview of what was to come upon review by the United States Supreme
Court.
91. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC ("FCC"), 113 S. CL 1806 (Rehnquist, Circuit
Justice 1993).
92. Id.
93. Id at 1807.
94. Id
95. Id. (quoting Ohio Citizens For Responsible Energy, Inc. v. NRC, 479 U.S. 1312, 1313
(1986)).
96. FCC, 113 S. CL at 1807.
97. Id. (citations omitted).
98. Id. at 1808.
99. Id.
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The case was then directly appealed from the District Court to the
United States Supreme Court. The issue presented to the Court was
whether must-carry provisions abridged the rights of freedom of speech or
of the press, in violation of the First Amendment."r ° The District Court's
judgment was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceed-
ings. ' The Court stated that, "issues of material fact remain unresolved
in the record as developed thus far. . ... 102
C. Court's Reasoning
1. Interpreting Congressional Intent
In its opinion, the Supreme Court majority began by providing some
background into cable technology and contrasting it to other communication
mediums. 3 The main point was that cable television, as compared to
the broadcast medium, experiences fewer inherent limitations.'0
4
Especially with the technological advances made each day, cable expands
its ability to accommodate more and more channels. In addition, the Court
reiterated Congress' finding that the cable industry is increasingly being
characterized by vertical integration and horizontal concentration. 5 This
unique phenomenon creates "barriers to entry" for broadcasters.16
The Court then highlighted the legislative history and intent of the
1992 Act. "Congress found that the physical characteristics of cable
transmission, compounded by the increasing concentration of economic
power in the cable industry, are endangering the ability of over-the-air
100. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2451 (1994). The text of the
First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. .
101. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2451.
102. Id.
103. See generally id. at 2451-52 (discussing the origin and development of broadcast and
cable television).
104. Turner, 114 S. CL at 2457.
105. Id at 2454. "[O]wnership of both production and distribution facilities is sometimes
referred to as 'vertical integration'...." GEORGE H. SHAPIRo ET AL., CABLESPEECH: THE CASE
FOR FtRST AMENDmENT PROTEcTION 126 (1983). Vertical integration makes it "harder for
broadcasters to secure carriage on cable systems, because cable operators have a financial
incentive to favor their affiliated programmers." Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2454. Horizontal
integration is characterized when there are "many cable operators sharing common ownership."
Id.
106. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2454-55 (quoting § 2(a)(4), 106 Stat. at 1460).
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broadcast television stations to compete for a viewing audience and thus for
necessary operating revenues."' 7  The Court's interpretation was that
Congress intended to guarantee the survival of free broadcast television, not
to disenfranchise cable systems.' 8
2. Determining Content-Neutrality
Next, the Court scrutinized the regulations to decide whether they
were content-based or content-neutral. 109 In dealing with this issue, the
Court's main focus is "'whether the government has adopted a regulation
of speech because of [agreement or] disagreement with the message it
conveys."'' ' 0 Using this approach, the Court concluded that since the rules
apply to all cable operators, the interference was not based upon the content
of the programming."' Also, the benefits and privileges of must-carry
provisions are conferred upon all broadcasters who request carriage."
2
The Court conceded that the must-carry provisions distinguish
between speakers (cable versus broadcast) in the television programming
market, "[b]ut they do so based only upon the manner in which speakers
transmit their messages to viewers, and not upon the messages they carry
.... ,"3 Cable operators are still free to choose any programming on all
channels not subject to the requirements."14 As for the channels they are
required to carry, cable operators are not being forced to affirm ideas
through such carriage. " 5 The Court's understanding of the 1992 Act was
premised on the belief that "Congress' overriding objective in enacting
must-carry was not to favor programming of a particular subject matter,
viewpoint, or format, but rather to preserve access to free television
programming for the forty percent of Americans without cable."
'" 6
107. Id. at 2454.
108. Id. at 2461.
109. Id. at 2459. In general, content-based regulations trigger heightened scrutiny, making
it more than likely that such regulations will be struck down. SMOLLA, supra note 7,
§ 3.02[1][a], at 3-10 to 3-1. On the other hand, regulations which are content-neutral usually
trigger a less rigorous standard of scrutiny, thereby allowing the regulation to stand. Id. at 3-11.
110. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2459 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989)).
111. Id. at 2460.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2462.
115. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2462.
116. Id. at 2461.
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3. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo"7 Is Not Applicable
The Court rejected appellants' reliance on Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo in arguing that the Court should apply a strict level of
scrutiny." s In that case, the newspaper refused to print Tornillo's
response to previously printed editorials critical of Tornillo's candidacy for
office." 9  The Tornillo Court held that the press possesses editorial
discretion and independence, protected by the First Amendment.'
20
However, the Turner Court found that the must-carry rules, unlike the
access rules struck down in Tornillo, "are not activated by any particular
message spoken by cable operators and thus exact no content-based
penalty."'' Therefore, the Court determined that the appellants' reliance
on Tornillo was incorrect, and a strict level of scrutiny should not be
applied. Whether or not cable is ordered to carry local stations, it is not
conduct that either makes a statement or is symbolic of one.
4. Cable's Special Characteristic
The Court then stated that "heightened scrutiny is unwarranted when
the differential treatment is 'justified by some special characteristic of' the
particular medium being regulated."'" In this case, the special character-
istics are the "bottleneck monopoly power exercised by cable operators and
the dangers this power poses to the viability of broadcast television."''"
Given this inherent advantage over broadcast television, the Court had
reason to believe that the must-carry rules are not so "evil" as to pose a
significant danger to free expression. 24 Therefore, the application of the
most exacting level of First Amendment scrutiny - strict scrutiny - was
not justified in this situation."z'
117. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
118. Turner, 114 S. C. at 2464.
119. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 243-44.
120. Turner, 114 S. Ct at 2464; see also Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258 (discussing the distinctive
function of newpaper editors and the level of First Amendment protection accorded to them).
121. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2465.
122. Id. at 2468 (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue,
460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983)).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2469.
125. Id.
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5. Applying the O'Brien"6 Test
The Court's reasoning rested on the application of the well-established
O'Brien test. 27 According to the test, a regulation will be sustained if:
"[1] it is within the constitutional power of the government; [2] it furthers
an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4] the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."'12  In the eventual
circumstance when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the
same course of conduct, the Court has held that "a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."'129
The first prong of the O'Brien test requires that the regulation be
within the powers of the government.'30 This prong has been treated as
superfluous.' 3' Today, there are practically no meaningful restraints on
the range of subject areas in which Congress may act. 32 In any event,
the federal government has a history of regulation in this area.
According to prong two, the regulation must further a substantial
governmental interest. '33  Here, the First Amendment notion of "the
marketplace of ideas"''" is certainly promoted by assuring public access
126. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
127. The Court decided in O'Brien that a sufficient governmental interest was shown to
justify defendant's conviction for burning his selective service registration certificate. Id. at 367.
368. This decision has become the standard for deciding whether a government content-neutral
regulation will be sustained, in light of its burden on speech.
128. Id. at 377.
129. Id. at 376.
130. ld. at 377.
131. SMOLLA, supra note 7, § 3.02[41[i][A], at 3-58.
132. ld.
133. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
134. Justice Holmes expressed the idea best:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competi-
tion of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), quoted in GEOFFREY
R. STON ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1017 (2d ed. 1991). Others have further elaborated on
the notion: "(R]eal world conditions also interfere with the effective operation of the marketplace
of ideas .... Consequently ... state intervention [may be] necessary to correct communicative
market failures." Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE
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to a multitude of information sources, which includes local broadcast-
ing. 3 The Court has held that "'protecting noncable households from
loss of regular television broadcasting service due to competition from
cable systems' is an important federal interest.""'
Prong three requires that the governmental interest be unrelated to the
suppression of free expression. 37 Since the Court has established that the
must-carry rules are not content-based regulations per se, the third prong
is easily satisfied.33 However, the fact "[t]hat the government's asserted
interests are important in the abstract does not mean, however, that the
must-carry rules will in fact advance those interests."
39
The problematic question arises with prong four, which requires that
the incidental restrictions on alleged First Amendment freedoms be no
greater than necessary to further the governmental interest. 14 In other
words, "whether the Government has adequately shown that the economic
health of local broadcasting is in genuine jeopardy and in need of the
protections afforded by must-carry."' 141  Here, even if Congress is
accorded substantial deference to its judgments, the hurdle presented by the
fourth prong cannot easily be overcome on inconclusive evidence. 42 The
majority believed that "the Government must further demonstrate that
broadcasters so affected would suffer financial difficulties as a result.',1
43
In this regard, the Court felt there was an incomplete record concerning the
actual effects of must-carry on the speech of cable operators and cable
programmers." Furthermore, there was inadequate consideration and
discovery into the possibility that there might be a "'constitutionally
acceptable less restrictive means' of achieving the Government's"'4 s ends,
which would be equally effective.' 46 The government would have to
entertain every reasonable option before coming to the conclusion that the
present regulations were the least restrictive available. The record failed
L.J. 1, 5 (1984), quoted in GEOFFREY R. STONE Er AL., CoNsTITUtrONAL LAW 1017 (2d ed.
1991).
135. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2470.
136. Id. (citing Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984)).
137. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
138. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
139. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2470 (emphasis added).
140. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
141. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2470.
142. Id. at 2471.
143. Id. at 2472.
144. Id.
145. Id. (quoting Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989)).
146. Turner, 114 S. Ct at 2472.
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to provide any such finding. 47 These were the unresolved factual
questions which forced the Court to remand the case for further proceed-
ings.
6. Concurring Justices
Justice Blackmun concurred separately only to "emphasize the
paramount importance of according substantial deference to the predictive
judgments of Congress .... ,,4. While he believed that Congress had
compiled an extensive record, he conceded that the standard for summary
judgment was nonetheless high because of the issue and values at
stake. 4 9 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun felt that any additional evidence
would be beneficial to the federal government's case."
Justice Stevens, concurring separately, would have preferred to affirm
the lower court's decision, but he chose to accommodate the majority.'
Justice Stevens' main disagreement concerned the amount of evidence
required by the majority. "Congress did not have to find that all broadcast-
ers were at risk before acting to protect vulnerable ones, for the interest in
preserving access to free television is valid throughout the Nation.
152
7. The Dissent
The dissent, led by Justice O'Connor, was vehemently at odds with
the majority opinion. First, the dissenters disagreed with the Court's
conclusion that the interest in diversity of views and information is content-
neutral.5 3  They believed that "[tihe interest in ensuring access to a
multiplicity of diverse and antagonistic sources of information, no matter
how praiseworthy, is directly tied to the content of what the speakers will
likely say."'
154
Second, "[t]he interest in localism ... cannot be described as
'compelling' for the purposes of the compelling state interest test."'55
147. Id.
148. rd.
149. Id.
150. Id at 2473.
151. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2475.
152. I& at 2474.
153. Id. at 2477.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2478 (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612-13 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
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The dissent felt that it was the role of the actual viewers and subscribers,
not the government, to dictate what fraction of their cable entertainment
should be of a local nature, based on demand. 56 This reasoning appears
to be based on laissez-faire ideology.
Lastly, the dissenters asserted that the must-carry provisions are
overbroad even under a content-neutral analysis.'57 Therefore, under such
circumstances, "'[b]road prophylactic rules in the area of free expression
are suspect.""' 158 In essence, the dissenting opinion clearly considered the
must-carry provisions to be unconstitutional. It is interesting to note that
the dissenters were so strongly confident in their position that nothing, not
even additional fact finding on remand, would change their minds. 59 If
this is any indication, cable opponents have an arduous task ahead in
winning support from this group of remaining justices.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Triggering the First Amendment
In any First Amendment case, the starting point is to determine how
the First Amendment is involved in the case at bar. Here, TBS and other
cable systems contend that their decision to choose which programming,
local or non-local, to carry on their channels is a form of speech or
expression protected by the First Amendment. 16° Furthermore, they
asserted that "this intrusion on the editorial control of cable operators
amounts to forced speech .... ."6 ' Unless cable operators can show that
all the channels they are carrying convey a common message, there is still
an opposing argument. The discretion involved in either adding or deleting
certain programming is usually a function of economic variables (e.g.,
viewer demand and advertising revenue) not speech concerns. t62 The
156. Turner, 114 S. CL at 2478.
157. Id. at 2480.
158. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
159. Id.
160. See generally ial at 2464-65 (discussing the editorial independence afforded to the press
by the Frst Amendment).
161. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2464.
162. Michael G. Vita & John P. Wiegand, Must-Carry Regulations for Cable Television
Systems: An Economic Policy Analysis, 37 J. BROADCASTINo & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 1, 2 (1993).
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Court, however, agreed that cable's editorial control over channel carriage
does trigger speech, unique from other media.
63
The Court struck down TBS's second contention (i.e., forced speech),
stating that it is difficult to argue that a First Amendment violation is
triggered when cable operators merely carry broadcast programming and
are not conveying any message.'" Cable has been viewed as a conduit
of broadcasting signals and not as a conveyor of messages endorsed by the
cable operator."6 When the regulation refers to all broadcast stations, the
application is clearly content-neutral. Cable's only argument is to assert
that broadcasting in general is an idea in itself. The Court had no trouble
disposing of such an argument. It reasoned that even though Congress
noted the value of broadcast programming throughout the 1992 Act, such
references do not automatically cast the must-carry scheme as content-
based.
166
The dispute on both sides may be far from resolved, but the Court
seems to have reached an effective compromise - a cable operator's
conduct is symbolic speech which is not necessarily violated by the must-
carry rules. This was but one step in determining the constitutionality of
must-carry. Only after moving past this initial threshold was the Court able
to proceed to the heart of the case.
B. Standard of First Amendment Review
The D.C. Circuit tactfully ducked the standard of review question
concerning the constitutionality of the must-carry provisions. 67  This
issue, which created great uncertainty in the courts below, was finally
decided by the Supreme Court in Turner. intermediate scrutiny will govern
cable television's must-carry provisions. 6 ' The Court rejected a strict
scrutiny test because there are special situations, such as the regulation of
broadcasting, which require that First Amendment standards be less
protective of free speech. 169 The Court recognized that interference with
163. See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text; see also Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2456
(discussing how cable television operators and programmers transmit speech).
164. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2465.
165. Id.
166. Id, at 2462.
167. See Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1454 (D.C. Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
168. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2469 (concurring with this part of the District Court decision).
169. SMOLLA, supra note 7, § 3.03[l][c], at 3-83.
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speech may trigger varying degrees of First Amendment scrutiny.7'
Having to decide between giving cable the greatest constitutional protec-
tion, analogous to the print media, or the least protection, like broadcasters,
the majority chose to accord cable "the middle of a First Amendment
continuum."'' This decision was based on the acknowledgment that the
programming cable delivers "provides an editorial point of view to
subscribers,"'72  thereby triggering a higher standard of review.
Furthermore, the Court felt that since the must-carry rules can prove
burdensome for cable operators and programmers, a greater degree of
scrutiny than "rational basis" is warranted. 74 While cable came short of
obtaining strict scrutiny protection afforded the print media, it at least got
more protection than traditional broadcasting."5
While this part of the decision can be viewed as a victory for
broadcasters, the Court seemed to apply a strict standard of review to the
facts of Turner. Justice Kennedy concluded his opinion by saying that "for
must-carry to survive, the FCC had to demonstrate not only that 'a large
number of broadcast stations would be dropped or repositioned in the
absence of must-carry,' but also show that without it, they would be
harmed financially."' 76  Is there a double standard in place here? It
appears that the Court is requiring the factual scenario that concurring
Justice Stevens feared - that broadcasting be at its "death throes."' 77
When considering the economic aspects involved in justifying a particular
regulation, questions of proof become problematic. After all, economic
studies and theories are only predictions based on continuing trends. The
Court has great discretion as to whether to accept these conclusions or to
require more substantial evidence. In this case, it chose the latter.
170. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2456.
171. Ted Hearn, Court Orders New Must-Carry Review, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, July 4,
1994, at 1.
172. Michael Burgi, Must-Carry's Murky Future, MEDIAWIEK, July 4, 1994, at 9.
173. Mark Glenn, Comment, Communications Law - A Must-Carry Rerun: Century
Communications Corp. v. FCC, 14 J. CORP. L. 265, 279 (1988).
174. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458.
175. Aaron Epstein, Cable TV Wins Greater Freedom, SACRAMENTo BEa, June 28, 1994,
at Al.
176. Hearn, supra note 171, at 38 (quoting Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2471-72).
177. Turner, 114 S. CL at 2474.
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C. Economic Aspects
1. The Effect of a Cable Monopoly on Broadcasting and Advertising
There are certainly critics on both sides of the question of whether
cable television is a monopoly. On the one hand, some people on the
government's side contend that must-carry is not an effort to favor
broadcasting over cable, but just a way of leveling the field and "pre-
vent[ing] anti-competitive practices ... in the market for the delivery of
television programming. 178  Congress views cable as exercising mono-
poly power to drive its competitors - broadcasters - out of the mar-
ket.'79 This view is clearly consistent throughout the 1992 Act."'0 One
critic, however, pointed out that "[f]ederal law prohibits both exclusive
cable franchises and unreasonable refusals to award competitive franchise
licenses."'' Therefore, a logical conclusion would be that cable
operators are not granted legally protected monopoly status by the
government or otherwise."8 2
Despite the fact that a cable monopoly cannot exist in the "legal"
sense, the practical reality may be very different. As cable industry analyst
G. Kent Webb concluded, cable television systems are a natural geographic
monopoly because "'[c]able systems appear to exhibit declining average
total costs in terms of the number of channels provided, the size of the
geographic area covered, and the number of subscribers served. '"1 83  In
178. Bruce Fein, Must-Carry Rule Must Go, LEGAL TIMEs, Jan. 17, 1994, at 22, 22, 46
(italics in original).
179. See generally Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102-385, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 1460, 1460-63 (1992) (presenting a list of 21 findings by
Congress to substantiate broadcast television protection).
180. See, e.g., "Without the presence of another multichannel video programming distributor,
a cable system faces no local competition. The result is undue market power for the cable
operator as compared to that of consumers and video programmers." § 2(a)(2), 106 Stat, at 1460.
"As a result of the growth of cable television, there has been a marked shift in market share from
broadcast television to cable television services." § 2(a)(13), 106 Stat. at 1462.
(16) As a result of the economic incentive that cable systems have to delete,
reposition, or not carry local broadcast signals, coupled with the absence of a
requirement that such systems carry local broadcast signals, the economic viability
of free local broadcast television and its ability to originate quality local program-
ming will be seriously jeopardized.
§ 2(a)(16), 106 Stat. at 1462.
181. Fein, supra note 178, at 46.
182. ld.
183. Robert S. Gregory, Comment, Regulating Cable Television: Quincy Cable's Unnatural
Approach to Cable's Natural Monopoly, 31 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 591, 623 (1986) (quoting G.
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other words, the greater the number of subscribers and channels offered
within a large service area, the greater the reduction in operation costs per
subscriber.
When analyzing cable's monopoly power, the principal concern is
whether cable is exercising monopoly power in local advertising mar-
kets.18 Local broadcasting stations depend on advertising revenues for
their existence. Therefore, if cable were to drop local stations, these
stations would be denied the opportunity to compete for funding sources
and cable systems would be endowed with this market power.'
This situation can also be viewed from the perspective of advertisers.
If cable systems are not required to compete with local stations for
advertisers, they might have the incentive to unilaterally raise the price of
advertising time.'86 With local stations out of the picture, advertisers
would have virtually no say in the matter because they would have no
alternative means to reach the viewing public."s Such a scenario could
result in the eventual downfall of not only the broadcasting industry, but
also the advertising business.
The majority opinion in Turner seemed to reflect the Webb no-
tion.188 The Court noted a critical distinction between cable and other
media, like a daily newspaper. "[While] both may enjoy monopoly status
in a given locale, the cable operator exercises far greater control over
access to the relevant medium."' 89 In other words, a newspaper subscrib-
er can buy a different paper without much trouble, while a cable subscriber
is forced to watch what he or she can pick up from the cable box. Clearly,
cable occupies a unique market position. Furthermore, the Court noted that
"[w]hen an individual subscribes to cable, the physical connection between
the television set and the cable network gives the cable operator bottleneck,
or gatekeeper, control over most (if not all) of the television programming
that is channeled into the subscriber's home."'90 Therefore, the majority
made its pro-broadcasting judgment based on economic concerns. 191
WEBB, THE ECONOMICS OF CABLE TELEVISION 63 (1983)).
184. Vita & Wiegand, supra note 162, at 2.
185. Id.
186. ld. at 7.
187. Id.
188. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
189. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2466.
190. ld.
191. Wrong Road on Must-Carry, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, July 4, 1994, at 14.
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2. The Potential Costs of Must-Carry
While there are harmful costs inflicted on broadcasting and advertising
from not having must-carry rules in place, there are also potential costs to
cable systems if must-carry rules stand. For example, cable might have to
eliminate some currently carried non-local programming if it has no
available channels' 92 Even assuming that cable systems can increase
their channel capacities with new technology, they would most likely pass
on the costs of expansion to their subscribers.'93 While having the best
of both worlds will not be cheap at first, viewers should have the
opportunity to make that choice and not be forced into subscribing to cable
exclusively.
Another argument is that a must-carry rule would provide less
incentive for cable to create new programming. 9 4 Initially, it is likely
that cable would be more preoccupied with trying to accommodate local
stations before even thinking about adding some programming variety.
While this might be true in the beginning, with the everchanging nature of
cable technology, it will not be long before the issue becomes moot. When
the information superhighway is expanded, cable systems will be more
concerned about filling all the unused channels with new programming.
Besides expanding cable technology, the FCC can also encourage the
industry to offer more program choices. For example, the FCC has already
adopted rules that took effect January 1, 1995, allowing cable operators to
raise their rates when they add channels.'95 The FCC appears to be
easing the restrictions imposed by the 1992 Act, to the dismay of consumer
groups.
Finally, there is the concern that if cable systems cannot differentiate
their services (i.e., offering a different variety of channels), "consumers
would buy from the firm with the lowest price (because output is
homogeneous across firms) . ...,, However, it must be remembered
that the whole purpose of must-carry legislation is to promote competition,
and to allow the consumer to shop around for the best deal in town.
Eventually, competing cable systems will acquire the same cable techno-
192. Vita & Wiegand, supra note 162, at 15.
193. Id.
194. Id at 16.
195. Jube Shiver Jr., FCC Moves to Spur New Cable Channels, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1994,
at DI.
196. Vita & Wiegand, supra note 162, at 17.
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logy and provide the same services, so price should be the competing
factor. This is the essence of a free market society.
On its face, the Court in Turner seems to explicitly agree that
broadcasters do have valid economic concerns; but in the end, it raises
doubts as to the sufficiency of evidence. Yet the Court does not address
any of the economic effects of must-carry toward cable. There needs to be
a careful weighing of economic effects on both sides. The Court is
certainly steering broadcasters as well as cable operators in a misleading
direction. Where does the must-carry issue now stand? What happens
next? These are just some of the daunting questions that demand
contemplation.
D. Aftermath of the Turner Decision
1. The Battle Continues
From the prior analysis, there appears to be no clear victory for either
side. The Court left both sides with no clear pronouncement on the
constitutionality of the must-carry provisions. One thing is certain however
- that the case will wind its way up to the Supreme Court a second time.
Will the Court then finally resolve the constitutionality issue? It is
uncertain whether the government will present enough "hard evidence" to
convince the Court that the harm to broadcasters is "real."
2. All Eyes on Justice Breyer
Another point of uncertainty after this ruling concerns the replacement
of Justice Blackmun by recently confirmed Justice Steven G. Breyer. Prior
to his appointment to the United States Supreme Court, Judge Breyer
participated in a "moot court" session in which students argued the
cable-broadcast case. This event, taped on C-SPAN, provided perhaps a
glimpse of his position.' 97 Judge Breyer only went so far as mentioning
that he was concerned that the 1992 Act gave broadcasters special
treatment.' 98
Some consider Justice Breyer a deregulator; 9 hence, he could give
197. Ted Hearn, Breyer Gives Initial Hint of His Must-Carry Views, MULTICHANNEL NEWS,
July 11, 1994, at 45, 45.
198. l
199. Kim McAvoy, Must Carry Survives... For the Moment, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
July 4, 1994, at 11. "Some dub him a technocrat and view his support for a cost-benefit
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cable the vote it needs to overrule the must-carry provisions.' Further-
more, Justice Breyer is unlikely to give as much deference to the findings
of Congress in the 1992 Act as Justice Blackmun did in Turner.20 '
Justice Blackmnun appeared to be the tie breaker in this first round.
However, now that he is retired, the result would be a four to four tie.
Justice Breyer may be taking Justice Blackmun's seat, but with a different
thinking cap.20 2 The other Justices on either side will probably not
change their positions in the next round. With such a split, anything can
happen.2 3 It will be interesting to see how Justice Breyer will cast the
deciding vote.
3. The Policymaking Spirit Lives On
Finally, one should consider the possible scenario of the Court
declaring must-carry unconstitutional. How will Congress react? Will
Congress go back to the drawing board and attempt to draft an alternative
approach? One would think that Congress would give up on its futile
quest. Yet, if Congress is willing to stand up for its convictions, the future
of must-carry might linger on. While the Clinton administration may still
retain control over the FCC, the past November midterm election results
could put a twist on things. The major Republican overhaul in both
Houses of Congress could result in amendments to the 1992 Act,
particularly the must-carry provisions. It is uncertain whether defense of
the regulations will continue, absent Democratic majorities in Congress.
A good characterization of the must-carry controversy is the "endless
policy loop."' Another more vivid characterization is "an unsatisfying
roller coaster ride, a continually changing pattern of regulation and
rationalization that has left many of the participants unhappy, most of them
confused, and nearly all of them nervous, awaiting the next rise or dip in
analysis of government regulation as miserly, at best." Henry J. Reske, Some Dems Lukewarm
to Court Pick, A.B.A. J., July 1994, at 20, 20.
200. McAvoy, supra note 199, at 11.
201. In a law review article, Breyer presented this view of legislative history: "The
'problem' of legislative history is its 'abuse,' not its 'use."' Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL L. REv. 845,874 (1991), quoted in Reske,
supra note 199, at 22.
202. "Breyer, by all predictions, is likely to be less liberal and more centrist than Blackmun."
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Crowded Center, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 78, 78.
203. It is important to note that this case was decided by a 5 to 4 decision. Doug Halonen,
Cable, Broadcast Weigh Must-Carry Ruling, ELECRONIC MEDIA, July 4, 1994, at 3, 3. This
lends credit to the notion that the must-carry issue is far from being clearly settled.
204. Stuart N. Brotman, The Curious Case of the Must-Carry Rules: Breaking the Endless
Policy Loop Through Negotiated Rulemaking, 40 FED. COMM. L.J. 399, 405 (1988).
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the political landscape."2'5 It has been suggested that parties on both
sides should put their differences aside and instead engage in negotiated
rulemaking.2°6 This may entail forming a committee with cable and
broadcast representatives that would meet and, with the help of a mediator,
propose new solutions that would later be adopted by the FCC.' 7
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Turner seems to be a good
compromise, but unless a clearer position is enunciated, there is still the
danger of inconsistent rulings in the future. This author agrees most with
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion. It would be foolish for the FCC to
wait until local broadcasters are eliminated before acting on a rising threat.
The must-carry provisions are fair and should remain intact. It is true that
new technologies should be encouraged and favored, but not to the extent
of driving other sources out of the market. Local broadcast stations can
and do provide a valuable service to the community. Even cable operators
acknowledge the fact that the must-carry issue will be irrelevant in a few
years, when the channel capacity is expanded." 8 Considering this, why
is cable so adamant in fighting the must-carry provisions? Only cable
operators hold the key to their own future development. Congress' role is
to protect the public interest at the present time. It cannot rely on
speculation that cable systems will eventually be able to accommodate local
broadcasters.
No matter which side ultimately prevails in the second appeal of
Turner, as one commentator put it, "[t]he decision seems destined to
become a landmark First Amendment opinion that will determine the free
speech rights not only of cable operators but also telephone companies and
205. PATRICK PARSONS, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (1987).
206. Brotman, supra note 204, at 405.
207. See generally i at 405-06 (discussing a proposal to break the chain of vexatious
litigation).
208. Burgi, supra note 172.
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other wannabe information highway delivery technologies." 2" Perhaps
when the Court ends the conflict between both sides once and for all, cable
and broadcast television can effectively work together toward more
progressive solutions.
LamDien Le*
209. Wharton, supra note 80, at 1, 39.
* This Note is dedicated to my parents in appreciation for all their moral, spiritual and
financial support through the years. I also wish to thank the staff writers and editors of the
Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal for their invaluable assistance with this Note.
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